What is the European Union supposed to be?

On 1 November 1993, the European Union was established by the Treaty of Maastricht. One could therefore assume that the process of EU integration started 30 years ago. However, this would be an erroneous conclusion, as its institutional beginnings can be traced back to right after the end of the Second World War. As early as 1950, Robert Schuman published his famous declaration in which he called for cooperation among the states of Europe. In 1952, the European Coal and Steel Community was established, followed six years later by the European Economic Community, of which the European Union is the current successor.

Undoubtedly, the process of European integration was meant to be something more than just a mechanism for rebuilding post-war Europe and preserving peace on the continent. The words of the pioneers of European integration bear witness to this. For example, Winston Churchill himself spoke of the need to create ‘a kind of the United States of Europe’ [1]. Alcide De Gasperi, Italian Prime Minister from 1945 to 1953, spoke of the need to give the European institutions a higher political will. In his view, European activity would otherwise be seen merely as an additional burden without the corresponding causal power [2]. Moreover, the already mentioned Schuman Declaration explicitly speaks of a European Federation [3].

Keeping the above in mind, it is important to consider which way the European Union should go. Voices on this subject can be heard on every part of  the political spectrum. There is also no shortage of the most extreme ones calling for the complete transformation of the Union into a single state and, correspondingly, the complete dismantling of the European institutions. This question seems particularly relevant in the context of the last several years, in which the countries of the European Union have collectively been affected by numerous problems, such as the 2008 financial crisis, the coronavirus pandemic or the war in Ukraine. Determining the future direction of the Community is also crucial in the context of the competition between the United States and China for the title of the world’s foremost superpower. The countries of Europe may individually take sides on the matter or jointly open a third front. The aim of this analysis is therefore to provide an overview of perspectives on what further integration of the EU Member States should look like.

Federalisation of the European Union

The federalisation of the European Union, i.e. its transformation into a single state consisting of several more or less autonomous entities that share power among themselves, would be the most profound way to integrate the Community. The United States, the Russian Federation and Australia serve as examples of federalised states. Under such circumstances, the European Union would become a unified organism, while its existing Member States such as Poland, Germany or Croatia would become internal entities with correspondingly limited freedom of action.

Dr Renata Mieńkowska-Norkiene, formerly associated with the Institute of Political Science in Paris and the Friedrich Wilhelm University in Bonn, among others, states that the federalisation of the European Union is the finalitè politique of the EU integration process [4]. In her work, she also points out that it is not a matter of imagination, but a real goal for the development of the Community, and a crisis necessity, even if individual Member States do not want to admit it [5]. In her view, the European Union can already be called a federation. However, it ought to be kept in mind that the concept of federation has taken on many meanings within academic discourse. In the most general sense, federalism stands for the distribution of sovereignty between different centres of power within one state. Thus, the inhabitants of the European Union have certain rights and obligations, given to them both by the authorities of the Member States and by EU institutions. Dr Mieńkowska-Norkiene highlights the fact that the Union is a constitutional federation because it possesses something that resembles a constitution (primary law), a legal federation due to the existence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the possibility to create secondary legislation, and a fiscal federation due to the existence of a common currency within the Eurozone and European taxes, as referred to within the Multiannual Financial Framework (2021 – 2027) [6].

Dr Mieńkowska-Norkiene also draws attention to the multitude of external factors favouring EU federalisation. These include Brexit, the coronavirus pandemic, crises in the countries on the EU’s eastern border or the need to define cooperation between EU states and the USA and NATO [7]. These problems affect all members of the Community to a correspondingly greater or lesser extent. In the context of the coronavirus pandemic, respondents from many Member States pointed to the need for deeper cooperation within the European Union. Among others, 91% of Portuguese, 55% of German and 56% of Bulgarian respondents were in favour of such a solution [8]. The response to many of the previously mentioned external factors, with particular reference to the coronavirus pandemic, was the enactment of the EU recovery fund – financial support on a scale hitherto unknown to the EU institutions. As Dr Mieńkowska-Norkiene mentions, the fund is the largest budget plan in the history of the Community, and additionally includes elements of incurring community debt and imposing taxes at the EU level [9]. These solutions are unprecedented in the history of the Union, and are reminiscent of state action in the face of an ongoing crisis.

In the context of a possible federalisation of the Union, the increasing sense of closeness between the citizens of the Member States (also EU citizens) and the Union institutions is also worth mentioning. In State of the Union addresses, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, sometimes refers to the citizens of the Union as ‘our citizens’ and not directly as citizens of individual Member States [10]. The outcome of a study conducted by Eurofund in September 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic is also worth addressing [11]. As emphasised by Dr Mieńkowska-Norkiene, the result of the study shows that trust of citizens of individual Member States in EU institutions increased significantly, while at the same time trust in state authorities decreased [12]. Therefore, it should be concluded that although the European Union is not a unified state in the form of a United States of Europe, federalisation tendencies can already be spotted in many actions of its institutions, together with a growing sense of belonging to a pan-European community among the citizens of EU Member States.

Each country has its own perspective

In spite of the multi-dimensional integration process and the already existing federalisation tendencies, the European Union is still a community of 27 states. Each is at a different stage of economic and social development and therefore has different needs and perceptions of what the cooperation within the Union should like. Consequently, this results in different expectations of individual states as to the further direction the Community should take. These differences can be highlighted by the examples of France and Hungary. At the same time, it should be noted that the civil societies of these countries do not approach the European Union in a uniform manner. In both the former and the latter country, there is a large percentage of the population that views the Union positively, as well as a not inconsiderable part thereof that looks at Brussels through sceptical lenses. For the purpose of this analysis, we will focus on the difference in attitudes towards integration, shown through the actions of the most prominent representatives of France and Hungary, as they create the official narrative binding their countries.

In an analysis of the French approach to the future of the EU, Dr Krzysztof Tomaszewski, who previously coordinated grants funded by the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Swiss Confederation respectively, emphasises the comprehensive and long-term nature of Emmanuel Macron’s outlook [13]. In his statements, the French president not only refers to the general concept of further integration, but also makes detailed proposals for changes to the entire system. These include the budgetary reform of the eurozone, the concept of a pan-European programme of support for local governments receiving migrants or the issue of taxation in the context of American internet giants [14]. It is also worth remembering that in Macron’s speeches one can find elements of an ideological bent that make it possible to believe that, in the eyes of the French president, “Europeanness” is more than just a common market or harmonisation of laws; it is something with which one can identify, like belonging to a particular nation or community. Indeed, whilst listening to the French head of state, one can hear about the ‘spirit of Europe’ or ‘European sovereignty’ in the context of the fight against ‘national egoisms’ [15]. All of these refer to the clash between the European model of liberal democracy and the authoritarianism and political populism with a nationalist bent that has characterised the governments of some Member States, such as Poland or Hungary. There is also the notion of a ‘European renaissance’, i.e. the need to reshape European civilisation in the face of a changing world [16].

Macron’s vision also focuses on the issue of strategic security of EU Member States. Here, too, the French head of state takes a multi-dimensional approach. He refers to both military defence and a new policy for protecting the borders of the countries that make up the Community. In that context, the president speaks about a renewal of the Schengen area, a unified asylum policy or the creation of a common border police [17]. Whilst reading the content of Macron’s speeches, one can get the impression that, in his eyes, deeper integration and the smooth functioning of the European Union is the way to secure France’s place at the most important geopolitical table. This is indicated by slogans such as ‘strategic autonomy for Europe’ and ‘third superpower’, or by Macron touching upon the dangers of Europe faithfully following the United States. This would result in the vassalisation of Europe, as the French president mentioned in a commentary given to Politico [18]. It can therefore be concluded that in a world played out by Washington and Beijing, Paris is in favour of the deepest possible integration of the European Union, the further development of which it sees as a condition for the survival of the French raison d’état.

On the other hand, Hungary, whose current policies are largely shaped by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, takes a different approach to the issue of further integration. Dr Dominik Héjj cites Orbán’s words from 2002, uttered before the Hungarian referendum on joining the EU. Orbán, who at the time was approaching the end of his term as prime minister, emphasised that, in his opinion, European integration was primarily a matter of economics [19]. Moreover, he stated that the Hungarian state could also function outside the European Union [20]. Such comments lead us to believe that Hungary, led by Orbán, does not see the European Union as an integral part of its interests. In this context, the Hungarian prime minister often emphasises the importance of identity, linked to the increased competences of national parliaments vis-à-vis the EU institutions and a return to the days when these institutions only functioned on the basis of strictly treaty-based powers [21]. Increasing the competences of national parliaments would also result in the transfer of some of the decision-making from EU institutions to the Member States. 

Moreover, the Hungarian prime minister openly rejects the ‘spirit of Europe’ mentioned by Macron. In Orbán’s view, cooperation within the European Union is not about the transfer of values between Member States, as these states are in a period of civilisational dispute. Dr Dominik Héjj highlights the outline of this dispute, which – in Orbán’s eyes – is between Central Europe, which is the core of European identity, and the West of Europe, which is devoid of values [22]. The rule of law is another aspect where the Hungarian prime minister emphasises his country’s separation from the ‘spirit of Europe’. As this issue is perceived somewhat differently in Hungary than in the sense of EU law, it is worth following the example of Dr Dominik Héjj [23] to directly quote the words of László Trócsányi, Hungary’s Minister of Justice from 2014 to 2019: “The Hungarian government’s position is that not only the Member States should be included in the mechanism meant to protect the rule of law, but also the EU itself. This is justified by the ever-increasing scope of Community competences.” [24].* Thus, it seems that current Hungary perceives the rule of law first and foremost in relation to the control of the actions of EU institutions, so that they do not exceed the competences granted to them and thus infringe upon Member States’ exclusive sphere of competence. It is also important to bear in mind the Rui Tavares Report of 2013, which was the basis for the triggering of the Article 7 procedure of the Treaty on European Union against Hungary. This article was aimed at protecting the rule of law in EU Member States. As Dr Dominik Héjj notes, the Hungarian authorities read the triggering of Article 7 TEU as a blow to the sovereignty of the law made by Hungarian institutions [25]. Dr Héjj also cites a memorandum from the Hungarian National Assembly, which treated the Union’s action as a violation of the balance between the competences of EU institutions and the freedoms of Member States [26]. Viktor Orbán himself, during a speech to the European Parliament in 2013, spoke in a style suggesting that Hungary did not join the European Union as a sovereign country for the Union to completely subjugate it [27].

It must therefore be concluded that, unlike France, Hungary sees the European Union as a platform for economic cooperation only. In Orbán’s view, not only is it wrong to grant wider competences to the EU institutions; these competences should even be curtailed in favour of the freedom of action of the Member States. With such an attitude, it is difficult to speak of support for deeper EU integration on Hungary’s part in the near future. The differences in the approach of the individual states to deeper integration of the Union, shown by the example of Hungary and France, are of fundamental importance. At the moment, the EU institutions do not have a legal mechanism that would allow them to ‘push’ the issue of further integration past the countries that are hostile to the idea. It seems, therefore, that under the current status quo, there is no other option but to take into account the positions of all Member States, even if they are extremely different, as is the case with France and Hungary. 

The enlargement of the European Union’s borders

When analysing the future of the European Union it is impossible not to consider the issue of the enlargement of its borders. There are academic circles that do not prioritise deeper integration of the Community, but rather the accession of more countries thereto. A scenario in which the European Union first absorbs more states of the continent, and only then decides to bring about the finalitè politique of European integration referred to by Dr Mieńkowska-Norkiene is therefore possible.

As it turns out, in the minds of professionals, the issues of border expansion and deeper integration go hand in hand. According to University of Houston-educated Tomasz Wróblewski, president of the Warsaw Enterprise Institute think tank, further enlargement of the European Union’s borders, including, inter alia, Ukraine and Turkey, is key to increasing the Community’s influence in the world and maintaining relevance in contact with the United States and China [28]. The territorial expansion meant to include the two countries mentioned above would mean that decision-making affecting the most important aspects of interstate relations would no longer be possible without taking the EU’s position into account. According to Tomasz Wróblewski, further integration of the internal market through lifting economic barriers will indeed lead to an increase in the wealth of the EU’s population, but not directly to an increase in its authority in the world. The President of Warsaw Enterprise Institute is apparently of the opinion that the issues of border expansion and deeper integration should go hand in hand.. According to Tomasz Wróblewski, such a move would make it possible to fully develop the strength of the EU’s common market, so that its economic potential, suitably enlarged by the accession of new states, could be fully unleashed and match the size of the US internal market [29].

The EU institutions also seem to see a correlation between the expansion of borders and the further deepening of European integration. As noted byElżbieta Kaca, an analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the European Parliament supports Ukraine’s accession to the EU [30]. However, it has to reckon with the opinion of countries that either explicitly doubt the sense of Ukraine’s admission to the EU (such as Hungary) or have supported the start of negotiations with Ukraine, but are not entirely convinced by the idea of it becoming a Member State (such as Austria or the Kingdom of the Netherlands). This is all the more problematic because, as the law currently stands, all Member States must give their consent to the accession of a new country to the EU. For this reason, a number of EU states (e.g. France and Germany) are calling for an institutional reform which, instead of requiring unanimous consent, would introduce the possibility of qualified majority voting on foreign policy issues [31].

Jolanta Szymańska, a coordinator of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, together with Tomasz Zając, an analyst at the same think tank, discussed the report commissioned by the French and German governments. The report argues for a change in the way qualified majority itself is calculated in view of the prospect of new states joining the Union. Currently, said majority involves the requirement to bring together a group of states which, in support of a given idea, represent at least 65% of the population of the European Union and 55% of its Member States. The solution proposed in the report would change these requirements to 60% of the population and 60% of the states respectively [32]. This is all the more important as most potential EU members, such as Moldova or Montenegro, have low populations, especially when compared to the largest countries of the Community. As Jolanta Szymańska points out, the equalisation of both indicators is a key reform in the context of the accession of new states to the Union [33]. The number of voices coming from professionals specialised in the field leads us to believe that the issues of border enlargement and further integration are not separate, interchangeable issues. Moreover, it can also be argued that, for the Union to function properly, the dialogue on institutional change should take place parallel to the discourse on the accession of new states. Border enlargement is therefore not only not an alternative direction to deeper integration, but they are phenomena that must go hand in hand if we want to increase the European Union’s position in the world.

Conclusion

Without a doubt, the idea behind the founding of the European Union was to make it more than just an association of loosely cooperating states. Although the federalisation of the Community seems to be the most advanced form of integration and a melody of the future, even today we can see a number of regulations, due to which the Union resembles a single state. Given the fact that individual members of the Community approach the question of the future of the Union in radically different ways, it needs reforms that will allow it to function smoothly in face of a potential decision-making paralysis. Otherwise, it will not realise its full potential. The phenomenon of border enlargement can and should go hand in hand with deeper integration, but will neither replace the integration, nor will it solve the problems facing the European Union.

Cover photography: Unsplash

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