On 1 October 2024 the term of the current NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg will come to an end. Countries forming the alliance will therefore be faced with a decision on who should replace the Norwegian when his term expires. The task will not be easy. As secretary general, Stoltenberg has been in this top civilian role of the alliance for over a decade. He has amassed a wealth of experience measuring himself against issues such as the consequences of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, the international security aspects of the migration crisis and, finally, the full-scale war in Ukraine. As Teri Schultz, a journalist for the Deutsche Welle portal, points out, the Norwegian has even earned the nickname ‘Trump’s charmer’ due to his ability to communicate with the former U.S. president, even during the height of tensions between Trump and leaders of other NATO countries [1]. Moreover, Stoltenberg demanded a significant increase in arms spending by the Federal Republic of Germany. He also played a huge role in negotiating with Hungary and Turkey for their consent to the accession of Sweden and Finland. It is therefore not without reason that Stoltenberg’s term of office has been extended as many as three times. First in 2018, for another four years, and then in 2022 and 2023. – in both cases for one more year.

Given the continuing threat from the Russian Federation and the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House, this year’s election of the secretary general may prove to be one of the most important in the history of the Alliance. In this article, I would therefore like to lean into how individual countries will approach the selection of the secretary general, mention some of the most important names in terms of candidates for the post, and discuss the challenges that the newly elected NATO leader will face.

The holistic interest of the Alliance versus the interests of individual states

According to a well-established tradition, an American always serves as the military commander of the Alliance, whereas the post of secretary general is held by a politician from Europe. Moreover, as Wojciech Lorenz, Coordinator of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, points out, the selection process boils down to informal talks and requires the consent of all states that form the Alliance [2]. Therefore, it is likely that the selection procedure may be used as a political mechanism, through which individual states will attempt to pursue their particular interests. Oana Lungescu, a former spokeswoman for Jens Stoltenberg quoted on the Deutsche Welle website, points out that a hypothetical entanglement of the selection, for example in internal EU disputes, the elections to the European Parliament or this year’s presidential campaign in the U.S., is the worst possible scenario [3].

That being said, just by looking at the approach of individual countries to the selection of the NATO secretary general, as well as the future of the Alliance itself, we can already see a difference of interests and, consequently, the possibility of using the selection for political gain. The division of interests is outlined somewhere between the countries of the ‘old NATO’, i.e. its founders, among whom we find the United States and Western European countries, and the ‘new NATO’ – the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that gradually joined the Alliance after the end of the Cold War. For example, in an interview with Rzeczpospolita, Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski, who has been associated with Oxford University and the European Parliament in the past, emphasises the lack of proper representation of Central and Eastern Europe at the top of the Alliance [4]. Said feeling of under-representation shared by the countries of the region is evident, for example, in the strong support for the candidacy of the President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, for the post of secretary general. Wojciech Lorenz believes that Iohannis’ candidacy and large-scale support it has gathered may not only indicate growing ambitions of Central and Eastern Europe, but also the differences in how the Alliance states see the issue of deterring the Russian Federation [5]. Emphasising the importance of the region and NATO’s eastern flank is also present in the rhetoric of Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, who has also expressed the desire to lead the Alliance. In an article on the Estonian Prime Minister’s policy, Bartosz Chmielewski – who used to study at universities in Vilnius and Kaunas – highlights her criticism of the Alliance’s defence plans of its eastern flank [6]. It can therefore be concluded that regardless of Kallas’ or Iohannis’ final endorsement, the CEE states will want to use the election to strengthen the role of the region within NATO.

However, things play out a bit differently in the ‘old NATO’ countries. According to media coverage, the candidate enjoying support from the U.S., Germany and the UK is Mark Rutte – Prime Minister of the Netherlands for the last 14 years. As Wojciech Lorenz points out, Rutte has been repeatedly criticised for lack of action to increase his country’s military capabilities and to allocate 2% of its GDP to defence, as required by the Washington treaty [7]. Once again, it is important to note here the increasingly apparent dichotomies in the interests of individual states of the Alliance. While countries of Central and Eastern Europe are concerned with increasing the spending defence capability and the empowerment of NATO’s eastern flank, Western European states, which do not feel directly threatened by Russia – are driven by other motives. 

Moreover, some of the ‘old NATO’ states even seem to be pursuing an autonomous policy, without considering the position of other states or even the holistic interest of NATO. France is an example of such a state. Indeed, from the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the Alliance states were unanimous in their view that the conflict would in no way involve NATO. In this context, Emmanuel Macron’s recent statements in which he openly talks about the potential need to bring Alliance troops into Ukraine are surprising. According to Łukasz Maślanka, an expert at the Centre for Eastern Studies who used to study at the Institut Universitaire de Technologie, such words could be directed not only towards foreign recipients such as Ukraine or Russia in particular. Indeed, Macron’s words could have been uttered for the purpose of his internal policies [8]. As argued by Lukasz Maślanka, by means of the aforementioned rhetorical escalation, the French President may want to make a clear division of the French society into pro-Russian forces, mainly centred around opposition far-right and left-wing groups, and centrist groups that support Macron, democracy and an international order based on the rule of law [9]. Macron’s words regarding the direct involvement of NATO forces in the war in Ukraine have been criticised by the US, Germany and Poland, among others. A scenario is therefore possible in which France puts domestic politics above holistic interests of the Alliance whilst placing its vote for the budding NATO secretary general.

Challenges facing the new secretary general

Undoubtedly, the main challenge for the new secretary general will be to guarantee the security of the countries of the Alliance in the context of the ever-growing threat from the Russian Federation. While the prospect of a full-scale conflict still seems an unrealistic scenario, experts are already paying attention to Russia’s activities in the sphere of cybersecurity. Anna Maria Dyner, an analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs and a graduate of the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program, highlights the scale of Russian cyberattacks. Citing a Microsoft report from October 2023, she points out that as many as 36 percent of identified Russian attacks targeted countries of the Alliance, 10 percent of which directly targeted Poland [10]. Anna Maria Dyner also points out that Russian cyber-attacks can be an integral part of a military operation and notes that immediately prior to the start of an open conflict, Russia had just hit the Ukrainian energy and banking systems [11].

The secretary general will also grapple with the idea of increasing NATO’s nuclear forces in Europe. Artur Kacprzyk, who is affiliated with the Polish Institute of International Affairs and has previously participated in international research projects – including the one on security in the Nordic-Baltic region that he co-led in 2017-18 – pays heed to Russian attempts to intimidate the Alliance with nuclear weapons. In his view, NATO should expand its nuclear weapons presence on the continent. The first step towards that goal would be to increase the number of states equipped with the F-35 fighters that are capable of carrying American nuclear warheads [12]. A further step would be to invite countries on the eastern flank, such as Poland, to the Nuclear Sharing programme, which involves the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO countries. Such a solution, already present in Germany, among others, has been repeatedly discussed in Polish internal politics. However, the aforementioned Wojciech Lorenz emphasises that from American standpoint, such a move would not make much sense, and the U.S. administration itself is not even interested in discussing this issue [13].

The upcoming U.S. presidential election should also be kept in mind. The subject of the Alliance’s continued future is being vividly raised during the campaigns run by all the major candidates. Both Joe Biden and Donald Trump have already touched upon said issue in their speeches. The incoming secretary general must reckon with the fact that the election may end in a victory for Donald Trump – no doubt a challenging partner to work with. Dr Krzysztof Rak, a past recipient of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation scholarship, highlights the significance of Donald Trump’s statement in which he said that he would not come to the defence of the countries of the Alliance unless they fulfil their obligation to contribute 2% of their GDP to defence capabilities [14]. The new secretary will therefore not only have to demonstrate his diplomatic skills in contact with Donald Trump, but also know how to influence states that do not commit the treaty-required amount of money to defence. Regardless of the nature of Donald Trump’s statements, increased spending will affect the combat readiness of the members of the Alliance, which, in the face of escalating NATO-Russia tensions, could prove to be a key deterrent.

Conclusion

In the face of Russian aggression on a scale unseen since the Cold War, the upcoming election of the NATO secretary general may prove to be one of the most important in the history of the Alliance. In spite of that, members states do not have a common policy on the issue, often putting their own needs above the holistic interest of the Alliance. The differences in approach can be seen in which candidate individual states have reportedly chosen to support for the post of secretary general. There is also a possibility that some member states of the Alliance will use the election to obtain political advantage of some kind. Whatever the outcome of the election, the new secretary general will face a number of challenges, with threats in the sphere of cyber security, the issue of the possible expansion of nuclear presence in Europe and the uncompromising character of Donald Trump, who may win this year’s US election, already lurking on the horizon.

Cover photo: NATO

Bibliography:

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[14] Krzysztof Rak, Trump szokuje! USA nie obronią Polski i innych sojuszników? – Krzysztof Rak i Piotr Zychowicz, interviewed by P. Zychowicz, [accessed 25 March 2024], accessible at:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-X-xoho2GNs